“Part of the Solution:” Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy

Document Type : Review Article

Authors

1 Centre for Health Policy, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

2 School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Abstract

Background 
For decades, the food industry has sought to deflect criticisms of its products and block public health legislation through a range of offensive and defensive strategies. More recently, food corporations have moved on to present themselves as “part of the solution” to the health problems their products cause. This strategic approach is characterised by appeasement, co-option and partnership, and involves incremental concessions and attempts to partner with health actors. This paper details how corporate practices have evolved and changed over the past two decades and gives some definition to what this new political economy signifies for the wider behaviours of corporations producing and selling harmful commodities.
 
Methods 
This paper draws on public health and political science literature to classify the food industry’s “part of the solution” strategy into three broad components: regulatory responses and capture; relationship building; and market strategies. We detail the key characteristics and consequences of each component.

Results 
The three components of the food industry’s “part of the solution” strategy all involve elements of appeasement and co- option. They also improve the political environment and resources of the food industry. Regulatory responses offer incremental concessions that seek to maintain corporate influence over governance processes and minimise the threat of regulations; relationship building fosters access to health and government stakeholders, and opportunities to acquire and maintain channels of direct influence; and market strategies to make products and portfolios healthier bolster the market share and revenue of food corporations while improving their public image.
 
Conclusion 
Rather being a signal of lost position and power, the food industry’s repositioning as “part of the solution” has created a highly profitable political economy of ‘healthy’ food production, alongside continued production of unhealthy commodities, a strategy in which it is also less burdensome and conflictual for corporations to exercise political power and influence.

Highlights

 

Commentaries Published on this Paper

 

  • Trust, but Verify; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

        Abstract | PDF

 

  • The Foundations of Corporate Strategies; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

        Abstract | PDF

 

  • Situating Food Industry Influence: Governance Norms and Economic Order; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

        Abstract | PDF

 

  • Responding to Food Industry Initiatives to Be “Part of the Solution”; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

        Abstract | PDF

 

  • Applying a Commercial Determinants of Health Lens to Understand, Expose and Counter Industry Co-option, Appeasement and Partnership; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

        Abstract | PDF

 

  • A World Beyond Transnational Corporations: Meeting Human Rather Than Corporate Need; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

        Abstract | PDF

 

 

Authors' Response to the Commentaries

  •   Political Economy and Research Silos: A Response to the Recent Commentaries

         Abstract | PDF

 

Keywords

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History

  • Receive Date: 09 February 2021
  • Revise Date: 12 August 2021
  • Accept Date: 21 August 2021
  • First Publish Date: 11 September 2021

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