Pandemic Agreement Must Include Levers to Redirect Pharmaceutical Industry Behaviour During Pandemics; Comment on “More Pain, More Gain! The Delivery of COVID-19 Vaccines and the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Role in Widening the Access Gap”

Document Type : Commentary

Authors

1 Department of Public Health, School of Psychology and Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

2 Centre for Social Impact, College of Business Government and Law, Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia

3 Nossal Institute for Global Health, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

4 School of Psychology and Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

5 School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia

6 Centre for Law and Genetics, Faculty of Law, College of Arts, Law and Education, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

Abstract

Borges and colleagues rightly argue that an international treaty is needed to curtail the profit-driven behaviour of the pharmaceutical industry during pandemics. The Pandemic Agreement currently being negotiated by Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) offers an important opportunity to equip nation states with greater leverage over industry behaviour. In this commentary, we examine the potential of current draft textual proposals for the Pandemic Agreement to redirect pharmaceutical behaviour in future pandemics. However, the future of the Agreement negotiations remains uncertain in the wake of the failure to conclude negotiations in time for the 2024 World Health Assembly (WHA). Further, there is limited consensus over proposals that could enable nation states to have greater leverage over industry behaviour. A concerted effort will need to be made to achieve a consensus text that shifts the status quo by giving nation states more power to curtail the self-interest of the pharmaceutical industry. 

Keywords


  1. Borges LC, Zeferino de Menezes H, Crosbie E. More pain, more gain! The delivery of COVID-19 vaccines and the pharmaceutical industry's role in widening the access gap. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2022;11(12):3101-3113. doi:34172/ijhpm.2022.6942
  2. Global Change Data Lab. Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations. 2024. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations. Accessed April 15, 2024.
  3. Parshall C, Maybarduk P, Baker B. Unmet Need for Paxlovid in LMICs During COVID-19 Emergency. Public Citizen; 2023. https://www.citizen.org/article/paxlovid-procured-supply-vs-health-need-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-through-the-end-of-2022/.
  4. Moore S, Hill EM, Dyson L, Tildesley MJ, Keeling MJ. Retrospectively modeling the effects of increased global vaccine sharing on the COVID-19 pandemic. Nat Med. 2022;28(11):2416-2423. doi:1038/s41591-022-02064-y
  5. Gozzi N, Chinazzi M, Dean NE, et al. Estimating the impact of COVID-19 vaccine inequities: a modeling study. Nat Commun. 2023;14(1):3272. doi:1038/s41467-023-39098-w
  6. Gleeson D, Townsend B, Tenni BF, Phillips T. Global inequities in access to COVID-19 health products and technologies: a political economy analysis. Health Place. 2023;83:103051. doi:1016/j.healthplace.2023.103051
  7. World Trade Organization (WTO). Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement. WTO; 2022. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/30.pdf&Open=True.
  8. Gleeson D, Scheibner J, Nicol D. Proposals to waive intellectual property rights for pandemic response products in the World Health Organization pandemic accord need Australia's support. Med J Aust. 2023;219(2):46-48. doi:5694/mja2.51990
  9. World Trade Organization. TRIPS Council Finalizes Preparations for MC13. WTO; 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/trip_13feb24_e.htm.
  10. Moon S, Alonso Ruiz A, Vieira M. Averting future vaccine injustice. N Engl J Med. 2021;385(3):193-196. doi:1056/NEJMp2107528
  11. Rizvi Z. Pfizer’s Power. Washington, DC: Public Citizen; 2021. https://www.citizen.org/article/pfizers-power/.
  12. Slade A, Hawkins N. Intellectual Property Rights and Advance Purchase Agreements in a Crisis. Intellectual Property Quarterly. 2022:1-32.
  13. World Health Organization (WHO). Proposal for the WHO Pandemic Agreement. WHO; 2024. https://apps.who.int/gb/inb/pdf_files/inb9/A_inb9_3Rev1-en.pdf.
  14. World Health Organization (WHO). Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to Draft and Negotiate a WHO Convention, Agreement or Other International Instrument on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response: Report by the Director-General. Seventy-seventh World Health Assembly, Provisional agenda item 13.4. May 27, 2024. https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA77/A77_10-en.pdf.
  15. McGivern L. Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights flexibilities and public health: implementation of compulsory licensing provisions into national patent legislation. Milbank Q. 2023;101(4):1280-1303. doi:1111/1468-0009.12669

Articles in Press, Corrected Proof
Available Online from 13 August 2024
  • Receive Date: 13 May 2024
  • Revise Date: 04 August 2024
  • Accept Date: 10 August 2024
  • First Publish Date: 13 August 2024