How Could We Establish Monitoring and Surveillance of Health-Harming Corporations and Can Governments Be Trusted to Do It?; Comment on “National Public Health Surveillance of Corporations in Key Unhealthy Commodity Industries – A Scoping Review and Framework Synthesis”

Document Type : Commentary

Authors

1 Tobacco Control Research Group, Department for Health, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath, Bath, UK

2 Centre for 21st Century Public Health, University of Bath, Bath, UK

3 School of Nursing, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA

4 Global Cancer Program, Helen Diller Family Comprehensive Cancer Center, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA

Abstract

In the context of growing interest in the commercial determinants of health (CDOH) which has been defined as “the systems, practices, and pathways through which commercial actors drive health and equity,” Bennett et al propose that governments implement monitoring of unhealthy commodity industries (UCIs) (including tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed foods) as part of their routine public health surveillance. We explore the evidence underpinning that suggestion and provide details on how corporate monitoring might be practically implemented drawing on lessons from tobacco industry monitoring which has been an established part of tobacco control. While governments should actively support such an approach as part of efforts to address commercially driven health harms, we urge caution in governments undertaking monitoring and identify significant barriers to implementation, while also suggesting ways in which those barriers might be overcome. 

Keywords


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Articles in Press, Corrected Proof
Available Online from 01 September 2024
  • Receive Date: 04 June 2024
  • Revise Date: 30 August 2024
  • Accept Date: 31 August 2024
  • First Publish Date: 01 September 2024