Are Corporate Political Actors Aware of the Health Risks Associated With Their Products?; Comment on “Corporate Political Activity: Taxonomies and Model of Corporate Influence on Public Policy”

Document Type : Commentary

Author

Health Systems Research Centre, National Institute of Public Health, Morelos, Mexico

Abstract

The analytical model proposal by Ulucanlar et al for the analysis of corporate political activity (CPA) establishes that corporate actors are aware of the high incidence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) associated with their products and protect themselves against the consequences. This model helps to identify the strategies used by various corporate entities to influence public policies and protect their interests. The CPA analytical model applies a critical approach to commercial determinants of health that allows us to understand how corporate actors take advantage of their systems-based management of power. Due to its inherent complexity, this analysis presents several unanswered questions requiring along with theoretical and empirical challenges. The situation described in this commentary points to the importance of monitoring the CPA at a global and local level, identifying opportunities that favor the regulation of political influence, to reduce the influence of the commercial determinants of health on the NCDs. 

Keywords

References

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History

  • Received Date: 21 March 2025
  • Revised Date: 21 July 2025
  • Accepted Date: 27 July 2025
  • First Published Date: 28 July 2025
  • Publish Date: 01 December 2025

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