The Foundations of Corporate Strategies; Comment on “‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy”

Document Type : Commentary

Author

Global Health Program, College of Public Health and Human Sciences, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA

Abstract

The “Part of the Solution” article describes how the food industry has evolved its strategies to respond to critics and government regulation by co-option and appeasement to create a less hostile environment. Rather than focusing research on single industries it would be more efficient and productive to focus on corporate political activities (CPAs) that directly influence democratic institutions and processes having authority over laws, policy, rules and regulations that govern industry. The most influential and direct CPA are election campaign donations, lobbying, and the reverse revolving door (RRD). In the United States those CPA flow from rights of corporations that underlie all industry strategies. The US history of how corporations obtained their rights is described, and research about the affirmative effects of those three CPA is summarized. Health research is needed about those CPA and their effects on health law, policy and regulation in the United States and other nations.

Keywords

References

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International Journal of Health Policy and Management
Volume 11, Issue 11
November 2022
Pages 2732-2735

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History

  • Receive Date: 11 February 2022
  • Revise Date: 24 March 2022
  • Accept Date: 28 March 2022
  • First Publish Date: 29 March 2022

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