International Journal of Health Policy and Management

International Journal of Health Policy and Management

Reputation, Co-Regulation, and “Soft Capture”: Corporate Political Activity of the Portuguese Food Industry

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
1 Epidemiology Research Unit (EPIUnit), Institute of Public Health, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
2 Faculty of Nutrition and Food Sciences, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
3 Inserm, Université Paris Cité, Paris, France
4 School of Medicine, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
5 National Healthy Eating Promotion Program, Directorate-General of Health, Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract
Background 
Corporate political activity (CPA) refers to practices through which commercial actors seek to influence public policy and prioritise their commercial interests. While extensively documented internationally, little empirical evidence exists for Portugal. This study provides the first systematic analysis of the CPA of the food industry in Portugal.
 
Methods 
We conducted a systematic document analysis, following a protocol developed by INFORMAS (International Network for Food and Obesity/Non-Communicable Diseases Research, Monitoring and Action Support), a network that monitors food environments. This was triangulated with semi-structured interviews and illustrated through two policy examples. Twenty-five food industry actors were selected based on market share, trade association membership, and relevance to policy debates. Publicly available materials (January 2022–December 2023) were collected and coded using Ulucanlar’s CPA framework, distinguishing framing and action strategies. Data were triangulated with 18 interviews conducted between July and December 2024 with informants from academia, government, industry, civil society, public health, and the media.
 
Results 
We identified 534 examples of framing and 799 examples of action strategies. Framing was dominated by portrayals of corporations as “good actors” aligned with health, sustainability, and national development. Action strategies focused on reputational management, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and the displacement of public health roles. Legal obstruction and overtly adversarial tactics were absent. Large multinational manufacturers and major retailers accounted for the highest number of coded CPA examples, with trade associations also represented among actors engaging in policy-related activities. Interviewees confirmed these patterns and expressed concerns over informal access to policy-makers, weak state capacity, and reliance on corporate-led initiatives.
 
Conclusions 
The food industry in Portugal primarily relies on reputational and co-regulatory strategies, with limited evidence of overtly confrontational tactics. These findings are consistent with a form of institutionalised influence in which corporate actors engage closely with public authorities and participate in governance processes in ways that may shape the direction and scope of public health policy.
Keywords

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  • Received Date 26 September 2025
  • Revised Date 23 April 2026
  • Accepted Date 01 June 2026
  • First Published Date 01 June 2026
  • Published Date 01 June 2026